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ABSTRAKSI 
Jaringan ad hoc bergerak (MANETs) adalah jaringan nirkabel multi lompatan dari  
terminal bergerak otonom tanpa infrastruktur tetap. Dalam MANET, sulit untuk 
mendeteksi terminal berbahaya karena topologi jaringan selalu berubah disebabkan 
dari mobilitas terminal. Deteksi pengacau adalah cara untuk mengidentifikasi 
perilaku mengganggu dan memberikan informasi yang berguna untuk sistem 
pengacau untuk merespon cepat dan untuk menghindari atau mengurangi kerusakan. 
Algoritma deteksi anomali ini memiliki keuntungan karena mereka dapat 
mendeteksi jenis baru serangan (serangan nol-hari). Dalam tulisan ini, Sistem 
Deteksi Pengacau berbasis pengelompokan (ID-Cluster) yang sesuai dengan 
kebutuhan MANET disajikan. Pekerjaan ini membahas kedua isu lapisan routing  
prilaku yang bermasalah, dengan fokus utama pada menggagalkan serangan routing 
dari Routing Sumber Dinamis (DSR). Untuk memvalidasi penelitian, studi kasus 
disajikan dengan menggunakan simulasi GloMoSim pada tingkat mobilitas yang 
berbeda. Hasil simulasi menunjukkan bahwa sistem yang diusulkan dapat mencapai 
kinerja yang diinginkan dan memenuhi persyaratan keamanan MANET. 
Kata Kunci: MANET, Sistem Deteksi Pengacau, serangan gangguan routing. 
ABSTRACT 
Mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) are multi-hop wireless networks of autonomous 
mobile nodes without any fixed infrastructure. In MANETs, it is difficult to detect 
malicious nodes because the network topology constantly changes due to node 
mobility. Intrusion detection is the means to identify the intrusive behaviors and 
provide useful information to intruded systems to respond fast and to avoid or 
reduce damages. The anomaly detection algorithms have the advantage because they 
can detect new types of attacks (zero-day attacks).In this paper, the Intrusion 
Detection System clustering-based (ID-Cluster) that fits the requirement of MANET 
is presented. This work addresses both routing layer misbehaviors issues, with main 
focuses on thwarting routing disruption attack Dynamic Source Routing (DSR). To 
validate the research, a case study is presented using the simulation with GloMoSim 
at different mobility levels. Simulation results show that proposed system can 
achieve desirable performance and meet the security requirement of MANET. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This document describes, and is written to conform to, author guidelines for the 
journals of AIRCC series. It is prepared in Microsoft Word as a .doc document. 
Although other means of preparation are acceptable, final, camera-ready versions 
must conform to this layout. Microsoft Word terminology is used where appropriate 
in this document. Although formatting instructions may often appear daunting, the 
simplest approach is to use this template and insert headings and text into it as 
appropriate. 
2. OVERVIEW OF DYNAMIC SOURCE ROUTING (DSR) 
The DSR protocol is composed of two mechanisms that work together to allow 
the discovery and maintenance of source routes in the ad hoc network [1], route 
Discovery Is the mechanism by which a node S wishing to send a packet to a 
destination node D obtains a source route to D. Route Discovery is used only when 
S attempts to send a packet to D and does not already know a route to D. and Route 
Maintenance Is the mechanism by which node S is able to detect, while using a 
source route to D, if the network topology has changed such that it can no longer use 
its route to D because a link along the route no longer works. When Route 
Maintenance indicates a source route is broken, S can attempt to use any other route 
it happens to know to D, or can invoke Route Discovery again to find a new route. 
Route Maintenance is used only when S is actually sending packets to D. 
3. ROUTING DISRUPTION ATTACKS AGAINST DSR 
As briefly overviewed in Section 4, nodes process route requests by sending back 
cached route replies or by re-broadcasting route requests in DSR route discovery 
phase whereas dropping some redundant ones, this paper will focus on the detection 
of attacks targeted at MANET routing protocols, more specifically on detecting one 
of the most important active attacks: routing disruption attack. 
4. CLUSTER-BASED INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM 
An intrusion detection agent is attached to each node. The agents cooperate with 
each other to form a complete MANET IDS. These IDS agents run independently 
and monitor local activities to detect abnormal behaviors. For the local IDS agent, 
we implement a Markov chain based anomaly detection algorithm. The anomaly-
based method is adopted because it is expected that more types of attacks will be 
launched against MANETs in the future. It is also difficult to obtain the complete 
trace of attacks, which are often required in designing a misuse detection algorithm. 
We logically divide the network into clusters to manage locally generated alerts. By 
integrating the net information from a wider area, this management framework could 
reduce false alarms and improve the detection ratio. In AD-CLUSTER, an algorithm 
utilizing attribute similarities is also presented to aggregate the locally generated 
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 AD-CLUSTER Framework 4.1.
We adopt a cluster-based intrusion detection framework based on the following 
considerations: 
 
Due to the dynamic nature of MANETs, alert flooding is expected in such an 
environment. Attacks are likely to generate multiple related alerts. By creating some 
alert concentration points, we can logically group related alerts together and reduce 
the false alarms generated for various reasons. Note that alert and alarm are different 
concepts as stated before. Flat architecture is undesirable in managing alerts. 
 
When mobility is high, the introduction of the message overhead to create and 
maintain the hierarchy is unbearable. We thus adopt a cluster-based framework. It 
also requires little mobility management efforts. Actually, AD-CLUSTER requires 
no extra control messages propagated within the cluster in order to maintain the 
framework. Whether it is an inter-cluster node or intra-cluster node. A node may 
change its role over time due to mobility. 
 Internal Model of IDS Agent 4.2.
The local IDS agent we use in AD-CLUSTER is shown in Figure 1 The data 
collection module is mainly responsible for collecting the security related data from 
various audit sources. The detection engine will use the data which are parsed, 
filtered and formatted by the data collection module to perform intrusion detection 
locally. The Local Aggregation and Correlation Engine (LACE) will locally 
aggregate and correlate the detection results from different detection engines in the 
IDS agent. No detection model stands alone as a catchall for network penetrations. 
In an environment with high security requirements, it is desirable to have multiple 
detection engines, which enable the use of different detection techniques.  
 
Figure 1. Diagram of an IDS Agent 
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They will complement each other to improve the detection performance. The 
functionality of LACE is to combine the detection results of different local detection 
engines. The functionality of Global Aggregation and Correlation Engine (GACE) 
depends on the type of the mobile nodes. If the node is an intra-cluster node, GACE 
is mainly responsible for transmitting the locally generated alerts to the gateway 
nodes in the same cluster; if the node is a gateway node, GACE is to aggregate and 
correlate the detection results from the LACE of its own agent and the LACEs of the 
intra-cluster nodes in the same cluster, and to cooperate with the GACEs of the 
gateway nodes with which it has physical connections. The intrusion response 
module is to handle the generated alarms. 
5. LOCAL ANOMALY DETECTION 
We use the following features that are sensitive to routing disruption attacks: 
PCR -Percentage of the change in route entries, and PCH -Percentage of the change 
in number of hops, which reflect the mobility of the network, to construct a Markov 
chain as the normal profile. Vector quantization (VQ) approach is used in this 
process to convert continuous raw audit data to categorized data items with 
minimum errors. In order to mitigate the impact of dynamics of MANETs on the 
construction of the normal profile, for those data items whose probability is below 
some threshold, we convert them to a common “rare” symbol. The output of the VQ 
is then used to construct a Markov chain model, which employs conditional 
probabilities in its transition probability matrix to represent the temporal profile of 
normal behavior. 
6. ALERT AGGREGATION 
Due to the lack of detailed analysis of attacks in MANETs, alert aggregation is 
very challenging in MANET environment. Potential complex attack scenarios could 
make the aggregation very complicated. Moreover, there are not many efforts that 
have been devoted to the local detection of MANET attacks. In this section, we 
provide our initial work in this respect. Because we lack detailed analysis of 
MANET attacks in the literature and sophisticated attacks may make the situations 
very complex, we only consider the same occurrence of attacks. Specifically, we still 
target at the routing disruption attack. Because there are not many efforts that have 
been devoted to the local detection of MANET attacks, we use the Markov chain 
based anomaly detection model described in Section 5 as the local detection model. 
 Collaboration Mechanism 6.1.
In mobile ad hoc networks, the attackers can launch attacks when they are close 
to victims. Thus, in general cases, through the local IDS agent attached to the node 
itself and/or neighboring nodes, these attackers can be detected. There are other 
kinds of attacks, however, which the attackers may launch far away from the 
victims. What’s more, two or more attackers may collude to launch more 
complicated attacks. In these situations, it is very difficult for the local IDS agent 
itself to detect the attacks. In addition, the results based on the local IDS agent could 
lead to a very high false positive ratio. There may exist two possible mechanisms for 
the gateway nodes to collaborate. One is the subscription-based mechanism. It is not 
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necessary that the gateway nodes collect all of the security related information from 
the IDSs of intra-cluster nodes in order to draw some conclusions. Based on its own 
status, the IDS of the gateway node can send a subscription message to its intra-
cluster nodes to subscribe security related information. The subscription message 
could contain information that is related to the required data. The intra-cluster nodes 
can thus generate corresponding messages to fit the subscribed requirement. This 
mechanism introduces low communication overhead. However, the gateway node 
needs to carefully analyze the messages in order to determine what information is 
needed.  
The other one is the local broadcast mechanism for IDS agents to collaborate. 
When the IDS of the intra-cluster node generate a local alert, it could locally 
propagate the detection results to its gateway nodes. When nothing is suspicious in 
the last period, there is no need for the local IDS to propagate security information. 
The neighboring gateway nodes could further collaborate with each other through 
the transmission of the security-related information. In this way, we avoid the use of 
global broadcast. It is also unnecessary to propagate local alerts inside the cluster 
every period. All these strategies can result in less communication overhead. This is 
important because message sending and receiving is very expensive in terms of 
energy consumption. This mechanism could also enable gateway nodes to collect 
enough information to make final decisions. For simplicity, we adopt the local 
broadcast mechanism in our implementation. In the cluster-based intrusion detection 
framework, only gateway nodes could generate alarms. The local IDS attached to 
local nodes could only generate alerts based on their local information and propagate 
these alerts inside the cluster. The gateway nodes, having gathered the alert 
information periodically, could make better final decisions. 
 
 Aggregation Mechanism 6.2.
 
The main objective of the aggregation algorithm and the cluster-based framework 
is to reduce false positive ratios and increase detection ratios by aggregating local 
alerts. Global alerts could be generated to provide more diagnostic information of 
attacks. By grouping alerts together, aggregation will allow a better evaluation of the 
progress of the attack. In order to do so, we need the definition of a data model in 
the form of a class hierarchy to describe the alerts. 
Class Hierarchy of the Alerts: We use the definition and implementation method 
recommended by the Intrusion Detection Working Group (IDWG) to describe the 
alert classes in AD-CLUSTER. The Intrusion Detection Message Exchange Format 
(IDMEF) [2] proposed by IDWG aims at wired IDSs. Its purpose is to define 
common data formats and data exchange procedures for sharing information of 
interest to intrusion detection systems. Due to the unique characteristics of MANETs 
and because we focus on the intrusion detection targeted at the network layer, we 
modify the IDMEF data model when designing the alert class. This includes adding 
some new classes (Cluster class, for example) and attributes related to MANETs, 
deleting some unwanted classes (User class, Process class, etc.) and attributes, and 
modifying the definition of some classes and attributes (Location attribute, etc.). The 
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alert class hierarchy for AD-CLUSTER using the UML notation. The alert class 
hierarchy is general in AD-CLUSTER. That is, it can be used as both the input and 
output of the LACE and GACE for better interoperability. When generating an alert, 
the detection engine formats it according to the class hierarchy. We generate all of 
our local alerts compliant with this format. 
Aggregation Algorithm: The performance of the aggregation algorithm depends 
heavily on the performance of the local detection model, the amount of information 
and the accuracy of the information it provides. In MANET environment, the 
possible alert burst may crash gateway nodes. Our cases are different. First, due to 
the lack of misuse based MANET IDS; we cannot assume the accurate identification 
of attackers provided by local IDSs. Second, the gateway nodes execute the 
aggregation algorithm periodically. At each time period, the aggregation algorithm 
aggregates the received local alerts and makes final decisions. If there is no alert 
received in the last period, no action is taken. This is computationally efficient since 
it avoids executing the algorithm every time an alert is received. Old gateway nodes 
can locally broadcast historical records. This can lead to the quick learning of new 
gateway nodes and thus quick response to intrusion, but requirs more bandwidth 
cost. Also, a new gateway node can obtain information quickly from local IDSs 
from their locally broadcasted alerts.  
Each node has the LACE and GACE module. They use different sources as the 
alert inputs: the input of the LACE is the local detection engines, while the input of 
the GACE is either the local LACE (to intra-cluster nodes) or the intra-cluster nodes 
in the same cluster and the neighboring gateway nodes (to gateway nodes). When a 
local node detects an anomaly, it generates an alert based on the proposed MANET 
IDMEF data model. This alert contains the identification of the node, the alert 
classification, the time information, and the information of the routing control 
packets in the recent history that could contribute to local alerts. The routing control 
packets in a given time interval are not sufficient for the intrusion detection. In our 
attack model, the local broadcast message also includes the local history of the 
aggregated routing control packets, i.e., how many routing control packets are 
received and from which node these control packets are sent out. This could help the 
gateway node make the final decision. Much information could be provided by the 
local alerts.  
We introduce a parameter P-routing abnormal. If the proportion of routing control 
packets from a certain address exceeds P-routing abnormal, it is abnormal and 
deserves further investigation. However, in normal cases, it is still possible that a 
node receives a high percentage of routing control packets from some certain node 
in a period, such as in the initial routing discovery period. This is the main reason to 
cause the false positive alarms of our aggregation algorithm. When there exist 
attackers in the network, things are different. The attacker would send many falsified 
routing control packets into the network to effectively disrupt the routing logic of 
the network. The local IDSs of the victims, using the Markov chain detection model 
described in the previous section, could generate the alerts and record the source and 
destination distribution of the routing control packets in the last period. The 
attacker’s address would dominate the source distribution of the routing control 
packets. Having gathered this information in the last period, the gateway nodes 
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could know the source address distribution of the routing control packets. If the 
probability of a particular source address exceeds some predefined threshold P, this 
address is then identified as the attacker’s address. Note that an attacker cannot use 
different IP addresses to send out fake messages. Otherwise, it can be detected easily 
by its neighbors.  
We now discuss how to decide P. The selection of P depends on attack intensity, 
attack time, node placement, etc. If the threshold P is low, the gateway nodes could 
identify the attack more accurately, thus achieving higher detection ratios. However, 
this could lead to high false positive ratios. If the threshold P is high, the gateway 
nodes could miss the attack, but reduce the false positive ratio. We propose a simple 
approach to decide P in the following way. In normal cases, for a given gateway 
node, if local alerts are received in a given time period, we first pick those source 
addresses whose aggregated probability is larger than the parameter P-routing 
abnormal. We denote these probabilities as Pti (i = 1, 2, . . . , nt) 
     ∑ ∑
   
  
⁄  
   
  
    (1) 
PGt represents, to gateway node G, the irregularity of the source address distribution 
of the routing control packets when the system is at normal status. Given a test trace, 
we compute its average over all gateway nodes: 
       ∑
   
                                          
 (2) 
 
Given the trace of intrusive activities, we first compute the attack address 
distributions contained in the routing control packets. We denote these probabilities 
as Pai (i = 1, 2,..., na). 
Suppose for a given gateway node G, it has ma time periods in which it receives 
local alerts, we compute the average of Pai , (i = 1, 2,..., na) over these ma periods as: 
     ∑ ∑
   
  
⁄  
   
  
    (3) 
PGa represents the source address distribution of the routing control packets in the 
gateway node G during the attack time. Given the trace of intrusive activities, we 
compute the average of PGa over all gateway nodes: 
         ∑
   
                                          
 (4) 
                                              (5) 
 
7. SIMULATION STUDY 
 Simulation Model 7.1.
Simulation Platform and Parameter Settings: We use a simulation model based on 
GloMoSim to investigate the performance of the proposed approaches. In the radio 
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model, capture effects are taken into account. We use the Distributed Coordination 
Function (DCF) of IEEE 802.11 for wireless LANs as the MAC layer protocol. It 
has the functionality to notify the network layer about link failures. We enable the 
promiscuous receive mode of nodes, which enables every received packets delivered 
to the network layer. In the simulation, 30 mobile nodes move in a 1,000 meter X 
500 meter rectangular region. In our simulation, the minimal speed is 3 m/s, and the 
maximal speed is 5 m/s. We change the pause time from 30 seconds to 900 seconds 
to investigate the performance influence at different mobilities. 8 source-destination 
pairs are selected randomly to generate Constant Bit Rate (CBR) traffic as the 
background traffic. The interval time for data transmission is 0.25 second. The size 
of all data packets is set to 512 bytes. A packet is dropped when no 
acknowledgement is received after seven retransmissions or when there is no buffer 
to hold the packet. The buffer size is set to 128 packets. All traffic is generated, and 
the statistical data are collected after a warm-up time of 300 seconds in order to give 
the nodes sufficient time to finish the initialization process. 
 Simulation Results 7.2.
We show that the local IDS constructed using feature PCH demonstrates better 
performance results than that constructed using feature PCR. Therefore, we use the 
local IDS constructed using PCH in this section to illustrate the simulation result. 
 
False positive ratio: We compute the false positive ratio of the aggregation 
algorithm based on the same test data used by the local Markov detection model for 
the purpose of comparison. If in the last time period, a gateway node receives no 
local alerts, it will take no action. As shown in Figure 2(a), the aggregation 
algorithm achieves much lower false positive ratios compared to that of the local 
IDS. 
 
Detection ratio: We measure the detection ratio from dividing the number of 
gateway nodes that actually generate alarms by the number of gateway nodes that 
should generate alarms. The result is illustrated in Figure 2(b). 
 
 
Figure 2. Performance of AD-Cluster 
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8. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
This paper presents the design of a cluster-based intrusion detection system for 
mobile ad hoc networks. Based on a local Markov chain based anomaly detection 
engine, an aggregation algorithm for AD-CLUSTER is presented and a suitable 
MANET IDS alert data model is described. Using the routing disruption attack as 
the threat model, we have carried out extensive simulation studies and demonstrated 
the effectiveness of our system.  
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